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Determining the parameters in a social welfare function using stated 
preference data: an application to health 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
One way in which economists might determine how best to balance the competing 
objectives of efficiency and equity is to specify a social welfare function (SWF).  This 
paper looks at how the stated preferences of a sample of the general public can be used 
to estimate the shape of the SWF in the domain of health benefits.  The results suggest 
that it is possible to determine the parameters in a social welfare function from stated 
preference data, but show that people are sensitive to what inequalities exist and to the 
groups across which those inequalities exist. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Fundamental to most resource allocation decisions in the public sector is the need to 
compare the benefits generated by alternative courses of action.  An important 
consideration when establishing priorities in the public sector is the amount of benefit 
generated by alternative allocations.  As a result, there has been considerable research 
effort devoted to developing technologies that allow the benefits from a range of public 
services to be measured and subsequently valued.  If benefits were the only 
consideration, then the objectives of public policy could be defined in terms of the 
maximisation of these benefits.  However, policy-makers, as well as the general public, 
are also likely to be concerned with how benefits are distributed.   
 
The economic notion of the social welfare function (SWF) is, in principle, a powerful 
device for determining how best to balance these competing objectives of efficiency and 
equity.  However, in practice, there has hitherto been only limited success in developing 
a SWF that is operationally useful.  There have been some attempts to estimate the 
parameters of SWFs from the stated preferences of individuals.  For example, in an 
extensive programme of research over many years, Amiel and Cowell have, in various 
ways, asked respondents to choose between one society with a high mean income but 
also a high variance in income and another society with a lower mean and lower 
variance in income (Amiel and Cowell 1999). 
 
Similar attempts have been made to estimate the SWF for health, using relatively small 
samples of students (Dolan 1998, Dolan and Robinson 2001).  In this context, a policy 
that maximises population health might be one that is of relatively less benefit to less 
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healthy groups, or a policy that reduces inequalities might do so by foregoing the 
opportunity to improve the health of the relatively healthy.  This paper demonstrates 
how the stated preferences of a sample of the general public can be used to estimate the 
parameters of a SWF in the domain of health benefits.   
 
The issues addressed in this paper are of central policy concern in many countries that 
have put into place policies that seek to improve overall population health and reduce 
health inequalities.  For example, the UK Government now has a policy of “improving 
the health of everyone, especially the worst off” (Department of Health 1999), which 
raises questions about what proportion of the health care budget should be earmarked 
for reducing inequalities, as distinct from improving health generally.  Similar questions 
are being addressed in such countries as Australia and New Zealand, which are seeking 
to improve the relative health status of indigenous populations (Rice and Smith 2001). 
  
In order for the SWF approach to be of any use to decision-makers, two main questions 
need to be answered: 1) what type of SWF is to be employed; and 2) how is the shape of 
the SWF to be determined?  Sections 2 and 3 deals with each of these questions in turn 
and show how we can determine the relative weight given to the benefits of the worse-
group vis-à-vis the better-off group.  Section 4 presents the results from an empirical 
study that elicited the public’s preferences over two health programmes, one that 
maximises health and one that reduces inequalities in health between particular 
population subgroups.  Section 5 shows how these data can be used to derive a set of 
relative weights to be given to a unit health gain to people from different population 
subgroups and hence to estimate the shape of the SWF.  Section 6 discusses the 
implications of the results. 
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II. DEFINING THE SWF 
 
Most economic models and resulting SWFs are welfarist in the sense that they rely on an 
individual’s subjective assessment of her own well-being and, as such, they are concerned 
with the distribution of individual utility.  The crucial distributional issue is how much 
utility each individual is capable of generating from the consumption of an additional 
unit of a good, irrespective of the reasons why one individual may obtain more utility 
than another (see Scanlon 1975).  However, ignoring the source of differences in 
individual utility may have damaging limitations in the context of interpersonal 
comparisons of well-being (Sen 1992).  The utility that an individual gets from a given 
input is largely determined by her past investment – a better educated person may be 
more productive in generating utility – and by her expectations – a socially 
disadvantaged person may adapt not to expect much.  Therefore, it might well happen 
that a deprived poor person generates less utility from a given health improvement, say, 
than a richer person does.  So, if health care were to be distributed so as to maximise 
utility, then the rich person should be given the treatment. 
 
This is a solution that would contradict many people’s concepts of fairness and has led 
to alternative conceptions of welfare that, in various ways, use ‘objective’ criteria to define 
well-being.  For example, Sen (1992) has argued that attention should be focused on an 
individual’s basic capabilities, which looks at what certain goods (such as health care) 
can do for her, rather than at the utility she derives from them.  Sen’s work has been 
influential in the debate about why health care is considered to be more important than 
many other commodities.  For example, Culyer (1989) has argued that health care, 
through its impact on health, enables an individual to ‘flourish’.  Thus, in the case of 
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distributing health care, what matters is not an individual’s subjective assessment of her 
own utility from health care but rather an ‘objective’ assessment of the improved health 
that health care may produce. 
  
This suggests that it may be appropriate to cast aside utility and instead define a health-
related SWF in terms of the different levels of health experienced by different groups 
(Dolan 1998).  In this paper, differences in health are represented as differences in 
average life expectancy and as differences in the proportion of people reporting a 
limiting long-term illness.  When the analytical objective is that of searching for a more 
equal distribution of health (rather than utility or health-related utility), a SWF in terms 
of health is potentially more useful in a policy context since life expectancy and long-
term illness are more readily interpersonally comparable than utilities (see Olsen 1997). 
 
In this study, we assume that health–related social welfare is a function of: a) the 
average levels of health of different groups within a given population; and b) the 
inequalities in health that exist between those groups.  Of course, differences in health 
exist within any population sub-group, as well as between groups.  In principle, the 
SWF could be estimated across groups of any size, including across individuals, but in 
practice it would be impossible to get reliable health data at such a micro level. 
 
There are a number of functional forms that this SWF can take, although an additive 
SWF with concavity to allow for inequality aversion has been widely used in the 
general economics literature (Atkinson 1970, Layard and Walters 1994, Little and 
Mirrlees 1974).  Here, a SWF with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) is 
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assumed (for a study comparing different types of specifications, see Amiel et al 1999).  
This means that: 
 
[ ] ,1rrbra HHW −−− += βα       ,0, ≥ba HH   ,1=+ βα   ,1−≥r   ,0≠r    [1]  
 
where W is the level of overall population health and Ha and Hb are the levels of health 
of groups of equal size.  (This function is, of course, generalisable to more than two 
groups, and to groups of different sizes).  The nature of the SWF, and the resulting iso-
welfare curves, is determined by r and α.   
 
The objective of this study is to derive the implied weights to be given to a unit health 
gain to one group relative to another.  This is represented as the marginal rate of 
substitution (MRS) along the relevant iso-welfare curve.  As such, reference is made 
only to contours of the SWF, and not to the level of social welfare implied by these  
contours.  In this respect, the CES SWF is equivalent to the Atkinson SWF (Atkinson 
1970) that was first proposed to address income distributions and has recently been used 
in the health context (see Dolan 1998, Dolan and Robinson 2001).  
 
The parameters α and β determine the rate at which the welfare of subgroups a and b 
enter the social welfare calculus, which, for example, may be used to represent different 
degrees by which different parties are held responsible for their own health.  In this 
paper, it is assumed throughout that α = β = 0.5.  This is a common assumption in the 
literature and is based on ‘anonymity’ which assumes that both individuals or groups 
are equally deserving of any given gain in well-being (Musgrave 1959, Boadway and 
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Bruce 1984, Harsanyi 1982).  The assumption also requires that both groups are of 
equal size. 
 
The parameter r measures the degree of aversion to inequality, as represented by the 
convexity of the iso-welfare curves.  If r = -1, social welfare is equal to the sum of 
individual health and there is no aversion to inequality.  This utilitarian-type SWF 
results in iso-welfare contours that are parallel straight lines with a gradient of -1, as 
shown by curve (a) in Figure 1.  If r > -1, there is aversion to inequality, as represented 
by a diminishing MRS between the health of the two groups; that is, along a given iso-
welfare curve, the greater the inequalities in health between the two groups, the greater 
is the weight given to the worse-off group relative to the better-off group.  This results 
in iso-welfare curves that are convex to the origin, as shown by curve (b) in Figure 1.  In 
the extreme, r approaches ∞ and all that matters is the health of the worse-off group.  
This results in a Rawlsian-type SWF with right-angled iso-welfare curves, as shown by 
curve (c) in Figure 1.  
 
III. ESTIMATING THE SHAPE OF THE SWF 
 
The question now is how do we measure the value of r?  One approach would be to 
retrospectively collect information on existing public polices and, on the assumption 
that government decision-making is rational, regress the data to estimate values for the 
parameters.  An alternative approach, which is the one adopted here, is to elicit the 
preferences of the general public over stylised questions specifically designed to allow 
us to estimate the values of r (see Amiel and Cowell 1999 for more discussion of the 
different approaches). 
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Williams (1997) suggests that respondents could be presented with the current unequal 
distribution of health and then asked to think about an equal distribution of health that 
makes them indifferent between the two distributions.  In this way, the general format of 
the questions would be similar to those used by Amiel and Cowell (1999), and by Amiel 
et al (1999) in their “leaky-bucket experiments”.  However, whilst it is possible to take 
income from one person and transfer it to another, it is not possible to redistribute health 
in the same way.  Moreover, if individuals evaluate outcomes as gains or losses relative 
to some perceived reference point, and if losses are weighted more heavily than gains 
(see Kahneman and Tversky 1984), then this will confound the calculation of the 
implied equity-efficiency trade-off.  Therefore, it seems more appropriate to calculate 
the value of r by considering the distribution of gains in health from an initial position.  
 
Figure 2 shows the basic format of the questions in relation to the SWF.  The initial 
situation (I) is presented to respondents together with a programme (A) that will benefit 
both groups by the same amount.  They are then presented with an alternative 
programme (B) that targets the benefit on the worse-off group.  The aim then is to 
determine, in an iterative way, how much programme B would have to benefit the 
worse-off group in order to be considered equally as valuable as programme A.  Once 
indifference between programmes A and B has been established, the value of r can be 
calculated.  From this, the weight given to a unit health gain to the worse-off group vis-
à-vis the better-off group can be calculated. 
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More formally, if Ha(B) stands for the value of health of subgroup a (who are assumed 
to be less advantaged at the initial point) at point B, then the corresponding gradient at 
the midpoint of A and B is: 
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Furthermore, by definition, the same gradient can be approximated as: 
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Therefore, by taking the logarithms of these and by solving this, a unique value of r 
(which is independent of the initial point) can be obtained: 
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The weight implied to the less advantaged group a relative to group b is calculated from 
the marginal rate of substitution: 
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Notice that the value of r increases exponentially with the extent of the equity-
efficiency trade-off (since the iso-welfare contour in Figure 2 is convex), and so the 
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mean of any group of values would give greater relative weight to the preferences of 
those most concerned about equity.  This makes it difficult to account for the strength of 
each individual’s preferences in the overall preferences of a group.  For this reason, we 
will concentrate our analysis and interpretation on the median.  Use of the median is 
also consistent with the median voter rule, which has been used to model public policy 
choices (Mueller 1979). 
 
Any one respondent could be asked to adopt a number of different perspectives when 
answering questions of the kind shown in Figure 2.  For example, she could be asked to 
think of herself as: 1) a member of the better off or worse off group; 2) facing a known 
or unknown probability of being in each of those groups; or 3) not being in either group.  
Some economists would argue that the first, personal perspective does not adequately 
detach individuals from their own self-interest (Harsanyi 1982) and others would argue 
that the third, citizen-type perspective is unsuitable since it ignores self-interest 
completely (Johannesson 1999).  This would leave the second perspective as the only 
appropriate one.  According to this view, the operational device of a veil of ignorance 
should be used since it detaches the individual from her own vested interest by 
concealing her position in society, but still asks her to consider allocation decisions on 
the basis that she herself will ultimately be affected by them (Rawls 1972). 
 
However, the use of the veil of ignorance to determine a just distribution is hotly 
contested.  Dworkin (1977) is highly critical of the hypothetical nature of the contract that 
people are asked to enter into.  Barry (1989) questions the link that is made between 
individual preferences from behind the veil with a just society once the veil has been 
lifted.  Broome (1991) suggests that, although a veil of ignorance establishes 
  
 
12 
impartiality, it is not enough to explain why people’s preferences about gambles should 
provide any reason to favour one social situation rather than another (but see also 
Harsanyi (1982) for an opposing view). 
 
For these reasons, it was decided not to use the veil of ignorance in this study.  Instead, 
we asked respondents to adopt a citizen’s perspective, rather like the one adopted by 
Amiel and Cowell (1999) in their empirical studies on income inequalities.  To us, and 
as famously emphasised by Rousseau (1762), there is legitimate distinction between a 
person’s self-regarding preferences based on her own self-interest and her society-
regarding preferences which reflect her views about what society should look like.  The 
distinction has more recently received attention – and support – from a number of 
economists and political scientists, including Harsanyi (1955) and Etzioni (1986).  We 
therefore collected information on a range of background characteristics in order to 
examine the extent to which self-interest might be playing a part in responses. 
  
IV. THE EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
Differences in health in this study, as noted in section 2, have been defined in terms of 
average life expectancy and rates of limiting long-term illness.  People are familiar with 
these representations of health and they provide us with the opportunity to test whether 
the SWF has a different shape depending on how health is represented.  The question 
that remains is which groups are these differences to be defined across?  The most 
obvious differences in health in the UK exist between the social classes (Acheson 
1998).  Of the six social classes often used in British surveys, we employ data 
concerning the top and the bottom classes.  Using differences between the highest and 
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lowest social classes highlights the extent of the prevailing inequalities and has the 
advantage that the fraction of the population in each of these classes is roughly the same 
(about 7% in each case). 
  
One of the questions we asked concerns difference in life expectancy at birth.  On 
average, people in the highest social class (such as doctors and other professionals) live 
five years longer than those in the lowest social class (unskilled manual workers such as 
cleaners).  Another question is about prevalence of limiting long-term illnesses.  For 
males aged 45-64, 12% of those in the highest social class report limiting long-term 
illness compared to 40% of those in the lowest social class.   
 
Furthermore, population subgroups other than social class were also used.  Differences 
of the same magnitude (5 years) in average life expectancy exist between women and 
men.  This means that by presenting other respondents with identical questions 
regarding life expectancy, but relating them to differences by sex instead of by social 
class, it is possible to test whether the value of r is a function of the groups across which 
the inequalities exist.  To further test the sensitivity of r, other respondents were 
presented with the same life expectancy and long-term illness differences across groups 
that were simply defined as the ‘healthiest 20%’ and the ‘unhealthiest 20%’ of the 
population.   
 
The questionnaire was administered during a face-to-face interview, which gave the 
interviewer the opportunity to assess the respondent’s understanding of the task and 
provided the respondent with the opportunity to ask any clarificatory questions.  The 
interview began with a brief description of the task and an explanation of the population 
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sub-groups used.  The questionnaire was developed through in-depth interviews and 
extensive piloting, during which time it emerged that the clearest way in which to 
represent the health of the two groups was in the form of graphical representations, as 
shown in the appendix.  For each of the life expectancy and long-term illness questions, 
respondents were first asked to make a discrete choice between Programme A (that 
benefits both groups by the same amount) and Programme B (that targets the same 
amount of overall benefit on the worse-off group).  They were told that the two groups 
were of approximately equal size and that the two programmes would cost the same.   
 
For those respondents who chose programme A, it was assumed that, since they were 
unwilling to target the worse off group when overall benefits were the same, they would 
also be unwilling to target the worse off group when overall benefits were reduced, and 
so no further sub-questions were asked.  Those respondents who chose programme B 
were presented with a series of pairwise choices in which the benefits from choosing B 
were gradually reduced.  This order was chosen to make the trade-off between 
efficiency and equity as transparent as possible and because it was felt that it would be 
cognitively less demanding for respondents than a random order that would have 
required them to ‘jump around’ between different trade-offs.  Note that respondents 
were not provided with the opportunity to state that they were indifferent between the 
two programmes.  This option was in the pilot interviews but was never chosen and in 
fact caused confusion. 
 
The interviews were carried out in two rounds.  The response categories presented in the 
two rounds are shown in Tables 1 and 2.  Differences in health by sex were used in the 
first round and differences by the healthiest and unhealthiest quintiles were used in the 
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second round.  Social class differences were also used in both rounds to allow for direct 
comparisons across the two rounds.  Respondents in the first round who initially chose 
programme B were presented with six additional pairwise choices.  The response 
categories in the second round of interviews were revised in the light of the distribution 
of responses from the first round, resulting in only four additional pairwise choices in 
the second round.  In addition to some of the response categories in the first round being 
largely redundant, this allowed us to test whether respondents were following a 
particular pattern of responses e.g. choosing the middle option. 
 
In order to interview a broadly representative sample of the general population, every 
8th person on the electoral register in three wards in York was contacted and invited to 
participate, for which they would receive £15.  Out of a total of 1,500 letters of 
invitation, 467 people (31%) agreed to take part.  To ensure representativeness, 140 
respondents were selected for interview based on information on a broad range of 
characteristics obtained from their reply slips.  In total, 130 individuals were 
interviewed by one of the authors and two other researchers.  The interviews took place 
at the University of York and lasted for about an hour, of which the first fifteen minutes 
were spent on the questions analysed in this paper.  Table 3 shows the characteristics of 
the sample, and confirms that the characteristics of those who attended the interviews 
were similar to those of the population of the Yorkshire and Humberside region. 
 
V. CALCULATING THE SWF 
 
The results from the empirical study are summarised in Tables 4 and 5.  For those 
respondents who initially chose to target on programme B but then switched at some 
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point to programme A, their point of indifference has been taken to be half-way 
between the last point at which they chose B and the first point at which they chose A.  
The precise trade-offs made by those who choose not to target and by those who always 
choose to target are indeterminate, and so, strictly speaking, r can only be calculated for 
those respondents who switch from programme B to programme A at some point.  For 
those who chose A in the initial pairwise comparison, we have assumed that r = -1 
although we cannot rule out the possibility that some respondents may have favoured 
increased inequality.  For those who always chose B, we have assumed that they are 
concerned only with equality and hence r approaches ∞, but again we cannot be sure.   
 
Columns 2-4 in Table 4 present the distribution of responses in the context of average 
life expectancy.  Since the implied trade-offs that respondents made between the social 
classes did not differ across the rounds (Mann Whitney U Test, p>0.05), the responses 
from both rounds have been pooled.  The median respondent is indifferent between 
people in the highest and lowest social classes living on average to be 80 and 75, 
respectively, and these groups living to be 78 and 75.5, respectively.  This is also the 
median response when the sub-groups are defined in terms of the healthiest and 
unhealthiest quintiles of the population.  However, when identical data are presented but 
the sub-groups are defined by sex, the median preference is to favour no targeting of 
men at all. 
 
Columns 2 and 3 in Table 5 show the results from the long-term illness question.  The 
median respondent is indifferent between a decrease in the rate of long-term illness of 
7% for both groups and a 2% and 8% reduction when the groups are defined by social 
class, and a 2% and 10% reduction when they are defined according to the healthiest 
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and unhealthiest quintiles.  These responses are not statistically significantly different 
from one another (Mann Whitney U Test, p>0.05).  The responses in Tables 4 and 5 
were not related to any of the personal characteristics shown in Table 3 (using the χ2 
test, p>0.05). 
 
The 5th column in Table 4 and the 4th column in Table 5 represent the implied value of 
the r parameter for all question options.  Notice that the value of r is independent of the 
level of health at the initial point (see equation [4]).  The implied weights at the initial 
point for each of the question options are given in the 6th and 5th columns of Tables 4 
and 5, respectively.  For example, at the initial point, a given gain in life expectancy to 
the lowest social class is, according to the median respondent, weighted about seven 
times as highly as an equivalent gain to the highest social class, whereas a given 
reduction in long-term illness is weighted about four times as highly.  
 
The final columns of both tables show the implied equity-efficiency trade-offs in terms 
of health at the initial point.  The concept is borrowed from the literature on income 
inequalities and is calculated here as the difference between average health and the 
“equally-distributed equivalent health”.  The latter represents the level of overall 
population health that, if distributed equally across the population, is as good as a given 
unequal distribution.  The negative values in these columns indicate the losses in 
efficiency people are willing to forego for equality between the two groups.  So, in the 
case of average life expectancy by social class in Table 4, the median respondent would 
be indifferent between the initial point (where the highest and lowest social classes live 
to be 78 and 73, respectively) and the point where both groups live to be 74.5; that is, 
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they would be willing to trade-off up to one year of the average health of these two 
groups if total health were distributed equally between them. 
 
  
 
19 
VI. DISCUSSION 
 
This study has sought to determine the shape of a health-related SWF from people’s 
stated preferences over various equity-efficiency trade-offs.  It indicates that it is 
possible to ask people to make meaningful quantitative trade-offs between efficiency 
and equity.  The results are consistent and plausible, and suggest that preferences are 
sensitive to the type of health inequalities that exist and to the groups across which the 
inequalities exist.  We are able to conclude that in this domain it is possible to specify a 
SWF that is useful for very concrete policy purposes. 
 
The study nevertheless raises a number of issues that warrant further discussion.  The 
questions were designed to present respondents with equity-efficiency trade-offs in 
policy-relevant and unambiguous terms, and in a manner that makes measurement 
possible.  In the first part of each question, the information regarding the size of the 
health gains of the two programmes was easy to understand and, in the second part of 
each question, the implications of choices were made clear through changes in the size 
of the bars on the graph.  However, to facilitate this visual representation, the scales on 
the graphs in the life expectancy question did not start at zero (see the appendix), and 
this could have led some respondents to perceive that the relative difference between the 
two groups was larger than it really was. 
 
In general, it has been shown that very subtle changes in the framing of a question can 
sometimes have a dramatic effect on responses (for an excellent review, see Rabin 
1998).  This study was designed to minimise the effects of certain framing effects but it 
is impossible to remove every potential bias.  For example, we were aware of the 
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evidence from other studies that suggests that respondents might be reluctant to give all 
the benefit to one individual or group (see, for example, Cuadras-Morato et al 2001).  
And so in our question about life expectancy (in which the targeted programme gives no 
benefit to the better-off group), it is encouraging that more people wish to target the 
lowest social class in this question than in the question about long-term illness (in which 
the targeted programme is of some benefit to the better-off group).  We went further, 
though, and asked respondents who chose not to target in the life expectancy question if 
they would have targeted if there had instead been a one-year benefit to the better-off 
group (and hence a three-year benefit to the worse-off group).  None of these 
respondents chose to revise their answers.  
   
There are also reasons for supposing that respondents might have been more inclined to 
choose programme A in both questions.  It is now well established that respondents may 
give greater weight to the losses of one group as compared to an equivalent gain to the 
other group (Schweitzer 1995).  Therefore, the questions were designed so that neither 
programme in the two questions involved any losses, and so that neither programme 
was presented as representing the status quo.  It is possible that loss aversion may also 
be present when considering potential as well as actual losses from a particular 
reference point (Dolan and Robinson 2001).  Therefore, if some respondents adopted 
the potential gains available to both groups in programme A as their reference point, 
then programme B would involve a ‘loss’ to the better-off group.  It would be 
interesting, and policy relevant, to test with further research how sensitive the degree of 
inequality aversion is to variation in the initial situation. 
 
  
 
21 
There is a status quo bias of a different kind that might have made respondents more 
inclined to stick with programme B if they chose it initially.  This relates to the fact that 
respondents were always presented with response categories in the same order; that is, 
programmes A and B start out being equally effective and then B becomes 
incrementally less effective.  This ordering was chosen to make the equity-efficiency 
trade-off as transparent as possible and was informed by the results from the pilot 
interviews which suggested that the trade-off questions would have been cognitively too 
difficult if the ordering of the response categories was randomised.  However, there is 
the possibility of a status quo bias whereby some respondents get ‘locked into’ choosing 
B throughout (see Samuelsen and Zeckhauser 1988).  Whilst we cannot rule out the fact 
that this ordering might have induced some respondents to choose programme B more 
often, many did eventually switch to programme A, suggesting that they became aware 
at some point of the loss in efficiency from continuing to choose B. 
 
There are also general questions relating to the reliability of stated preference data, 
particularly of the kind gathered in this study, which asked respondents to consider their 
preferences over benefits to other people.  As with other studies that have sought to 
elicit citizen-type preferences over different public policies, it is not possible to test our 
results against the preferences that respondents reveal in their private consumer-type 
behaviour.  Economists are certainly brought up to believe that preferences that are not 
motivated by any degree of self-interest cannot be trusted, but this scepticism follows 
from the assumption that social welfare is primarily a function of the utility levels of self-
interested individuals.  This is certainly contestable since, although self-interest exists, it 
does not necessarily follow that it must be the basis for social welfare calculations since 
society may adopt any objective or set of objectives that it desires (see Menzel 1999). 
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A related criticism of studies of this kind, which use face-to-face interviews, is that 
some respondents may have given what Miller (1992) refers to as ‘Sunday Best’ 
responses; that is, “the views that people think they ought to hold according to some 
imbibed theory as opposed to the operational beliefs that would guide them in a 
practical situation.”  We certainly cannot dismiss this possibility but many people did 
not wish to target (including over one-third of respondents in the life expectancy by 
social class question), so evidence of it is weak.  In any event, there is an argument that 
only those preferences and social values that people are prepared to air publicly should 
be used to inform social policies which are designed to incorporate the public’s views 
on social justice (Gauthier 1986).  
 
Despite concerns such as these, we believe that this study represents a distinct advance 
in terms of both the methodology used and usefulness for policy purposes.  It suggests 
that differences in average life expectancy could be more important to people than 
differences in rates of long-term illness.  Another particularly striking result is that 
differences in the average life expectancies of men and women did not seem to matter 
much at all, with the median respondent unwilling to sacrifice any overall gains in life 
expectancy in order to target men.  Future research might try to get behind some of the 
reasons for the very different attitudes towards health inequalities by sex as compared to 
those by social class. 
 
In conclusion, this study has demonstrated that, using carefully designed questionnaire 
instruments, the SWF can develop from being a theoretical construct to becoming a 
powerful practical policy tool.  A survey instrument can be designed that elicits 
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meaningful trade-off responses from the general population that can then be used to 
determine the shape of the SWF.  We therefore believe that the study indicates a 
promising new avenue of economic enquiry that is highly relevant to important public 
policy questions. 
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Figure 1: The effect of changes in the value of r
Hb
Ha = Hb
I
(a)(b)
(c)
I'
0
Ha
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ha, Hb: health of sub-populations a and b 
I: the initial state 
I': the point where the health levels of the two groups are exchanged 
It is assumed that α = β 
 
Three different types of social welfare contours: 
(a): r = -1 … cf. the classical utilitarian  
(b): -1 < r < ∞  … cf. equity-efficiency trade-off 
(c) r = ∞  … cf. the Rawlsian 
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Ha: health of the less advantaged group 
Hb: health of the more advantaged group 
I: initial point 
It is assumed that α = β 
 
A: outcome offered by programme A 
the horizontal broken line: the set of options (1 to n) offered by the alternative 
programme B 
B: the point at which the median respondent is indifferent between the two programmes, 
and thus the point through which the iso-welfare curve crosses the broken line 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The SWF and the life expectancy questions
Hb
 A Ha = Hb
   n .… B …1
 I
iso-welfare
0 Ha
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Table 1: Life expectancy response options 
 
The initial situation is one in which group a (the worst-off group) live to be 73 and 
group b (the best-off group) live to be 78.  The numbers in the table show average 
increases in life expectancy per group for each of the pairwise choices. 
 
1st round 2nd round 
Programme A  Programme B Programme A Programme B 
Group a Group b Group a Group b Group a Group b Group a  Group b 
2 2 4 0 2 2 4 0 
2 2 3.5 0 - - - - 
2 2 3 0 2 2 3 0 
2 2 2.5 0 - - - - 
2 2 2 0 2 2 2 0 
2 2 1.5 0 - - 1.5 0 
2 2 1 0 2 2 1 0 
 
 “-” indicates where a response category was not offered to respondents 
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Table 2: Long-term illness response options 
 
The initial situation is one in which group a (the worst-off group) have a rate of limiting 
long-term illness of 40% and group b (the best-off group) have a corresponding rate of 
12%.  The numbers in the table show percentage reductions in the absolute rate per 
group depending on the programme chosen for each of the pairwise choices. 
 
1st round 2nd round 
Programme A  Programme B Programme A Programme B 
Group a  Group b Group a Group b Group a Group b Group a Group b 
7 7 12 2 7 7 12 2 
7 7 11.5 2 - - - - 
7 7 11 2 - - - - 
7 7 10 2 - - - - 
7 7 9 2 7 7 9 2 
7 7 8 2 - - - - 
7 7 7 2 7 7 7 2 
- - - - 7 7 5 2 
 
 “-” indicates where a response category was not offered to respondents 
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Table 3: Respondent characteristics 
 
 Sample Yorkshire and 
Humberside* 
Sex:   
Male 48% 47% 
Female 52% 53% 
Age:   
<44 years 50% 49% 
>45 years 50% 51% 
Mean age 49  
Dependants:   
Children 67% 66% 
No children 33% 34% 
Economic status:   
Employed 54% 56% 
Other 46% 44% 
School leaving age:   
Minimum 60% 61% 
Stayed on 40% 39% 
   
N 130 4014 
 
* The Annual Survey of English Housing 1998/1999 and The British Household  
Panel Survey 1998. 
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Table 4:  Average life expectancy questions 
 
Life exp. of 
group a  
Social 
class 
Sex 
 
Quintiles Implied r Implied weight  
at initial point 
Implied  
trade-off 
77 or more 24 20 12 -1.0 1.0 0.0 
       
76.75 0 1 - 2.3 1.2 -0.1 
76.50 5 - 2 5.8 1.6 -0.3 
76.25 0 0 - 9.8 2.0 -0.4 
75.75  2 1 - 19.9 4.0 -0.8 
75.50 11 - 14 27.5 6.6 -1.0 
75.25 11 5 - 40.3 15.5 -1.4 
       
75 or less 13 4 5 Infinity Infinity  
 
Median respondent in bold 
 “-” indicates where a response category was not offered to respondents 
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Table 5: Limiting long-term illness questions 
     
Percent without 
illness in group a 
Social 
class 
Quintiles Implied r Implied weight 
at initial point 
Implied 
trade-off 
72 or more 14 9 -1.0 1.0 0.0 
      
71.75 1 - -0.8 1.1 -0.2 
71.5 3 1 -0.6 1.1 -0.5 
71.25 0 - -0.4 1.2 -0.7 
70.5 1 - 0.2 1.6 -1.6 
70.0 5 9 0.7 1.9 -2.3 
69.5 6 - 1.3 2.4 -3.0 
68.5 7 - 2.9 4.4 -4.9 
68.0 13 14 4.1 7.1 -6.2 
67.5 5 - 6.2 15.9 -7.9 
      
67 or less 11 0 Infinity Infinity  
 
Median respondent in bold 
 “-” indicates where a response category was not offered to respondents 
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Appendix: Example of the questions – average life expectancy by social class 
 
As you might know, average life expectancy differs by social class. 
 
Whilst actual life expectancy varies between individuals, on average, people in social 
class 1 live to be 78 and in social class 5 they live to be 73.  
 
Imagine that you are asked to choose between two programmes which will increase 
average life expectancy.  Both programmes cost the same.  
 
In the two graphs below the light grey part shows average life expectancy, and the 
dark grey part shows the increase in life expectancy.  There is a separate graph for 
each of the programmes.   
 
As you can see, Programme A is aimed at both social classes equally and Programme 
B is aimed more at social class 5. 
 
Please indicate whether you would choose A or B by ticking one box.  
 
 
Programme A      Programme B 
 
       Class I            Class V              Class I               Class V  
  
 
 
 
If the respondent chose A, that was the end of the question.  If the respondent chose 
B, she was told: 
 
“Choosing Programme B might mean that the increase in life expectancy is less 
overall.  For each of the six [or four, depending on the round] choices below, please 
tick one box to indicate whether you would still choose B, or whether you would now 
choose A.”  
 
The presentation of the choices was of the same kind as that illustrated above 
 68     68 
 
 70 
2 years 
 74 
 72 
 76 
 78 
 80 
 82 
2 years 
 
70 
0 years 
74 
 72 
 76 
 78 
 80 
 82 
4 years 
